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Encouraging the Responsible Use of Land
By Municipalities: The Erosion of Nullum

Tempus Occurrit Regi and the Use of
Adverse Possession Against Municipal
Land Owners
I. Introduction
The ancient doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi' historically
prohibits the use of adverse possession by private landowners to acquire
land owned in fee by governments. 2 As the role of government has
become more convoluted and complicated over the decades,' both courts
and legislatures have eroded this doctrine.
Currently, only municipal4 government land owners are subject to

adverse possession claims when the held property has not been applied
to a public use.5 One rationale behind this erosion of governmental
immunity is to encourage the "active and efficient use of land."6

However, all jurisdictions do not agree on this trend. Still much
disagreement exists over not only the applicability of adverse possession
to municipal governments, but also on the meaning of public use and the

public policy rationales on allowing such claims.
This comment analyzes the different methods that jurisdictions use
to apply adverse possession claims to municipal governments, and it

I. Translated, this means "time does not run against the king." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1068 (6th ed. 1990).
2. R.P. Davis, Annotation, Acquisition by Adverse Possessionor Use of PublicPropertyHeld
by Municipal Corporation or Other Governmental Unit Otherwise Than for Streets, Alleys, Parks,
or Common, 55 A.L.R.2d 554, 559 (1957) ("With respect to states, the great preponderance of
authority is to the effect that, absent legislation so permitting, title to lands held by the state in any
capacity cannot be obtained by adverse possession or prescription.").
3. See GEORGE A. PINDAR, AMERICAN REAL ESTATE LAW 480 (The Harrison Company
1976). The number of authorities created by state or federal legislation has increased over the years.
Such authorities include: housing authorities, development corporations, port corporations, hospital
and school authorities, which, although agencies of the government possess the mobility and
flexibility of private enterprise. Id.
4. Municipality is defined as "a legally incorporated or duly authorized association of
inhabitants of limited area for local government or other public purposes. A body politic created
by the incorporation of the people of a prescribed locality invested with subordinate powers of
legislation to assist in the civil government of the state and to regulate and administer local and
internal affairs of the community." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (6th ed. 1990).
5. Davis, supra note 2, at 616. The general rule is that land, owned by a municipality, which
is not held for a public use or, in other words, is held in a proprietary capacity, may be acquired
by adverse possession or prescription in the absence of statutes to the contrary. Id.
6. Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 1991).
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evaluates these methods' role in encouraging municipalities to partake in
responsible land use. This analysis will explain the concept of adverse
possession, explain the concept of nullum tempus occurrit regi, analyze
the different methods by which jurisdictions apply adverse possession to
municipal governments, and evaluate the effectiveness of these different
methods on municipalities' efficient and responsible use of their land
holdings.
II. Adverse Possession
Adverse possession is the method of acquiring title by possession of
real property in a specified manner and over a period of time set by
statute. The expiration of that time period bars the owner's right to
bring an ejectment action and, for all practical purposes, transfers title
from the owner to the possessor.7
The state statutory formulations of adverse possession stem from an
English statute, the Limitation Statute of 1623.8 This statute provided
that all actions for the recovery of land or the exercise of rights of entry
must be brought within twenty years after the title and cause of action
first descended. 9 In the United States, the states adopted several
variations. 0
Although these renditions may differ, all adverse
possession statutes share similarities.
Overall, for possession to be adverse, the possession must be:
(1) actual, (2) open and notorious, (3) hostile, (4) exclusive and (5)
continuous." Due to their innate ambiguities, the meanings of these
elements are the subjects of countless cases. "Actual" requires some
degree of physical occupation. 2 "Open and notorious" usually means
"possession that gives visible evidence to one on the surface of the
possessed land." 1' "Hostility" means that possession is without the
permission of the legal owner.' 4 "Exclusive" means that possession is
not shared with the legal owner. ' "Continuous" means that possession

7. Id. at 201; see also Patten v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 459 A.2d 1177
(N.J. 1983).
8. PINDAR, supra note 3, at 474.
9. Id.
10. These variations include: the length of the statute of limitations, the meaning of
possession, and the significance of the payment of taxes. Id.
11.

ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 808 (2d. ed. 1993).

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

ADVERSE POSSESSION

must continue without significant interruption for a period of time,
determined by the individual jurisdiction.' 7

6

Several policies govern the foundation of adverse possession. The
rationale behind adverse possession rests in a "sound public policy to
encourage those who diligently develop and improve the land as against
those who are content to hold the bare legal title inactively for many
years." 8 Also the statute of limitations for adverse possession fosters
a policy of compelling litigants to bring claims before evidence and

memories begin to fade. 9 Adverse possession also promotes certainty
of title. 20
III. Nullum Tempus OccurritRegi
Beginning in England, the doctrine nullum tempus occurritregi has
provided government land owners with immunity from the tolling of the
adverse possession statute of limitations set by the legislature. 2' In the
United States, both federal and state courts adopted this concept, naming
it nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae.' But sixty-eight years after the
independence of the United States, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
statutes of limitation could run against some forms of government,
namely municipal corporations.' As a result, a trend progressed over

16. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 11, at 808.
17. Common statutes of limitation for the recovery of real property are five, ten, fifteen, and
twenty years. RALPH E. BOYER, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 49 (4th. ed. 1991).
18. PINDAR, supra note 3, at 475.
19. Id.
20. Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 1991).
21. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 246-47 (G.
Sharswood ed. 1859) ("Nullum Tenpus Occurrit Regi has been the standing maxim upon all
occasions; for the law intends that the king is always busied for the public good, and therefore has
not leisure to assert his right within the times limited to subjects."); see also Williamstown Borough
Authority v. Cooper, 591 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal granted, 602 A.2d 861 (1992).
22. BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at 247.
23. Lessee of the City of Cincinnati v. The First Presbyterian Church, 8 Ohio 298 (1838). The
Court in Lessee found that:
The principle, that the sovereign power of a state is not bound by statutes of
limitation, without express words, obtained in the earliest stages of the common law, has
descended to this day. This rule is sometimes of odious application; but it is adopted as
incidental to sovereignty, and necessary to preserve against negligence or cupidity, those
rights which the state has acquired or retained.
This immunity, however, seems to be an attribute of sovereignty only. No case is
found in the books which exempts any other description of person, whether natural or
artificial, from the operations of the laws; and none of the reasons for the exemption,
apply with much force to municipal corporations. The law imposes upon them the duty
of defending the interests which they are created to hold, and has conferred every power
necessary to this end. When the property is their own, the statute has been always held
as binding; when their land, or franchises are of public character, the public which they
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the decades and formed the general rule that private individuals may

adversely possess municipal land held for a non-public use. For some
time there has been a movement to eradicate nullum tempus occurrit regi
altogether.24
IV. Techniques for Application
The problem with applying adverse possession to municipalities lies
in the ambiguities associated with the concept of the public use.
Jurisdictions have generally disagreed not only on the applicability of
adverse possession to municipalities, but also on the meaning of when a
municipality uses land for a public purpose. Some jurisdictions define
public uses to include most municipal land holdings,' while others
The following section examines how
provide a narrow definition.'
several different states apply adverse possession to municipal
governments and how these states determine whether a particular public
use exempts the land from the statute of limitations.
A. The Public Use PresumptionApplication
1.
The Vermont/Connecticut Approach.-Both Vermont and
Connecticut have adopted the public use presumption method of applying
adverse possession to municipal land owners.' In Jarvis v. Gillespie"
and American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of

represent, are principally members of their own body, sufficiently powerful to defend
them. The rights of the corporation, therefore, seem well enough protected without
invading the letter of the statute. And the very loose and indefinite character of some of
these rights renders the protection of the law peculiarly necessary for the security of
occupants.
Id. at 310.
24. Note, Developments in the law, Statutes of Ltmitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1252-53
(1950). Many legal scholars feel that the sovereign exemption is no longer justified and lacks a
sound grounding in policy. Id. Several arguments have been asserted. First, legislatures have
consistently repudiated the protection-of-taxpayers argument when they have made local governments
susceptible to statutes of limitation; therefore, this argument has been rejected by the very body that
it was meant to defend. Id. Second, sovereign immunity causes prejudice to private defendants due
to the delay and inefficiency encouraged by the exemption. Id. Third, the argument that statutes
of limitation should not be applied to busy government officials is not consistent with the burden
placed on the same officials through tax and penal laws. Id.
25. See, e.g., Town of Sandwich v. Quirk, 566 N.E.2d 614 (Mass. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 64 (1991).
26. See, e.g., Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1991).
27. See American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of Trumball, 574 A.2d 796
(Conn. 1990); Jarvis v. Gillespie, 587 A.2d 981 (Vt. 1991).
28. 587 A.2d 981 (Vt. 1991).

ADVERSE POSSESSION

Trumball,29 the respective courts created a rebuttable presumption that
a municipality owns land for a public use. The adverse possessor may
rebut this presumption by actual evidence to the contrary.
In Jarvis v. Gillespie, the Supreme Court of Vermont delineated this
approach.3" In 1935, the Town of Waterville, Vermont, acquired a 1.2
acre parcel of land. 3' At that time, the Town had no plans to develop
or use the parcel.32 In 1947, the plaintiff, Royal W. Jarvis, purchased
two hundred acres of land, which surrounded the 1.2 acre tract on three
sides. 33 The fourth side was bounded by a road.' Between 1947 and
1986, the plaintiff used the parcel in an exclusive and visible fashion
amounting to adverse possession.33
In 1986, the Town of Waterville conveyed the parcel to the
defendant, Hubert Gillespie, by quitclaim deed.36 After the parties
clashed over the ownership of the property,37 the plaintiff filed a
declaratory judgment action to establish ownership of the parcel by
adverse possession. 31 The trial court concluded that the plaintiff had
established title to the property by adverse possession. 39 The Supreme
Court of Vermont affirmed the findings of the trial court' and clarified
Vermont's stance on the use of adverse possession to acquire title to land

29. 574 A.2d 796 (Conn. 1990).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 983. The parcel was acquired from an administrator of the prior owner's estate.
Id. The prior owner had mortgaged the land to the Town in 1932, and the Town took title after his
death. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Jarvis v. Gillespie, 587 A.2d 981, 983 (Vt. 1991).
35. Id. at 983-84. The court cited the following finding:
Plaintiff had used the land for a variety of purposes, such as grazing cattle and
horses, parking vehicles, as a staging area for a logging operation on surrounding
property, and to store slab wood from a sawmill which was located on adjacent property.
The court also found that during that period plaintiff, at various times, maintained a fence
on the roadside boundary of the parcel, tapped maple trees on the parcel, posted 'No
Trespassing' signs on the parcel, and built a loading ramp on the parcel for the logging
operation which remained in use to load and unload his tractor after the logging operation
ceased. The court found that these uses were clearly visible from the road which abutted
the parcel. Further, the court found that plaintiff was the only person to make use of the
property for any reason during the period and that neither the Town of Waterville nor the
public made any use of the parcel during that time.
Id.
36. Id. at 983.
37. Defendant removed the "No Trespassing" signs from the parcel that Plaintiff had put up.
Id. Plaintiff then replaced the signs and built a fence on the parcel. Id.
38. Id.
39. Jarvis v. Gillespie, 587 A.2d 981, 984 (Vt. 1991).
40. Id. at 988.
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owned in fee by a municipality. 41 A Vermont statute served as the

basis for this reasoning.42
Vermont's statute permits private individuals to use adverse
possession to gain title from municipal land owners so long as the land
has not been dedicated to a "public, pious, or charitable use." 43 While
the statute theoretically permits adverse possession claims against
municipal governments, it does not explain how to ascertain a public use.
The Supreme Court of Vermont held that courts should broadly define
a public use. ' This broad definition is expressed through a rebuttable
presumption that all land owned by a municipality is dedicated to a
public use or will eventually be dedicated to such a use. 45 The adverse
possessor can only overcome this presumption by proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that the municipality is neither currently
using the property for a public purpose, nor is planning to use the
property for such a purpose in the future.'
Vermont took its approach almost verbatim from Connecticut's rule
in American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of
Trumball.47 In American Trading, the court based the public use
exception on an earlier Connecticut case, Goldman v. Quadrato.'

41. See id. at 987-88.
42. Id.; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §462 (1973). "Nothing contained in this chapter shell extend
to lands given, granted, sequestered, or appropriated to a public, pious, or charitable use, or to lands
belonging to the state." Id.
43.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 462.

44. See Jarvis, 587 A.2d at 987-88.
45. Id.
46. Id. ("Evidence to be considered in determining this issue may include ... whether the
town has manifested an intention to use the property in the future.").
47. 574 A.2d 796 (Conn. 1990). American Trading concerned a narrow, overgrown strip of
land connecting a park to a public road. The Town acquired this strip of land when it acquired the
park land in 1937. Id. at 797. The plaintiff, who acquired the land through which the strip passed
in 1985, brought a quiet title action claiming that its predecessor in title believed that they owned
the strip and acquired title through adverse possession. Id. The court applied the following rule:
"[p]roperty that is held in fee simple ownership by municipalities must be presumed to be held for
public use. It follows that the party seeking title by adverse possession must bear the burden of
rebutting that presumption." Id. at 802. The court concluded that the strip was immune from
adverse possession since it was acquired originally as a roadway and the plaintiff did not carry its
burden of proving that the Town did not hold the strip in a public use capacity. Id. at 803; see also
David Nadvorning, Town's Fee Simple Presumed to be for Public Use, THE NAT'L L.J., July 16,
1990, at 38.
48. 114 A.2d 687 (Conn. 1955). Goldman concerned title to a parcel of land which the City
of Waterbury acquired by tax foreclosure in 1923. The city did nothing with the land until it
conveyed it twenty-four years later in 1947. d. During that time, the property was adversely
possessed. Id. The court held that "the city held the lot subject to the same legal consequences as
would have ensued if an individual had been its owner" since the land had not been put to a public
use. Id. at 688.

ADVERSE POSSESSION

Although Vermont's rule in Jarvis is essentially the same as
Connecticut's, in the dicta of American Trading, the Connecticut
Supreme Court exhibited hostility to adverse possessors and their
claims.4 9 Therefore, adverse possessors of municipal property should
expect less favorable .treatment in Connecticut than in Vermont, although
both jurisdictions place a heavy burden of proof on the adverse

possessor

°

Adverse possessors of municipal property in Vermont or
Connecticut will face a tough battle in overcoming this rebuttable
presumption. Proving that land is not held for a public purpose is
achievable, but proving that the municipality has no future plans to
develop or use the property is difficult. In order for an adverse
possessor to disprove the existence of future development plans, the
possessor must prove the municipal record owner completely ignored the

property in question, or the municipality attempted to convey the
property, thus implicitly acknowledging that it did not have any public

use plans for the parcel.

Since municipalities in Vermont and

Connecticut are on notice of these rulings, municipalities will likely
safeguard all their land holdings by slating them for a public use. 5'
Therefore, adverse possessors of municipal lands in these states may find
themselves carrying an unachievable burden of proof.
Although the Connecticut and Vermont courts explained how to
apply the public use exception and enumerated some public uses,52
neither court defined actually a public use." Therefore, Connecticut
and Vermont may need to clarify this definition through additional
litigation. Still, adverse possessors in Vermont and Connecticut will

49. See id.; Roche v. Fairfield, 442 A.2d 911 (Conn. 1982); Loewenby v. Wallace, 166 A.2d
150 (Conn. 1960). "Municipal immunity from adverse possession is the rule and not the exception,
and we have consistently held that the party seeking to acquire title by adverse possession bears the
burden of proving all the elements of adverse possession." American Trading, 574 A.2d at 802.
50. This differing tone may stem from not only the philosophical views of the respective
judges, but also from the fact that Connecticut lacks a specific statute like Vermont's which refers
to municipal susceptibility to adverse possession and the public use exception. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-575 (West 1991).
51. The municipality could easily keep lists of all their properties available for public review
along with some type of proposed development. Even if the municipality is unsure of financing for
the proposed project, such a wish list would probably keep the law on their side and cause the defeat
of any adverse possessors' claims. The courts do not even state what constitutes a plan for a future
public use.
52. The courts have suggested such uses as: Present plans, future plans, land set aside for
future space, greenbelts left in their natural state for the benefit of the community or the
environment, and buffer land between a park and encroaching development. See id.; Jarvis v.
Gillespie, 587 A.2d 981 (Vt. 1991).
53. See American Trading, 574 A.2d at 800.
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prove their cases with less difficulty than in Massachusetts, where the
public use exception is applied narrowly.
2. The MassachusettsApproach.-LikeVermont, Massachusetts has
enacted a statute that allows adverse possession of municipal land when
such land has not been dedicated to a public use.' Unlike Vermont,
the Massachusetts courts strictly apply the public use exception.
In Town of Sandwich v. Quirk,5 5 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that "[m]unicipal tax foreclosures interrupt the
twenty-year adverse possession period, thereby defeating private
trespassers' claims to title in land . . . [i]n effect turn[ing] the adverse
possession clock back to zero."56 Although this ruling failed to discuss
whether tax takings are public uses under the statute,57 the decision
demonstrates the difficulty of establishing an adverse possession claim

against a municipality. Whenever a municipality takes land for the nonpayment of taxes in Massachusetts, any adverse possessors of that land
must start over and begin possessing adversely against the municipality
for the statutory period.
According to David H. Morse, chairman of the Title Insurance
Committee of the Boston Bar Association's Real Estate Section, the Town
of Sandwich opinion essentially establishes that courts will rarely pass

54. The Statute provides:
No action for the recovery of land shall be commenced by or in behalf of the
commonwealth, except within twenty years after its right or title thereto first accrued, or
within twenty years after it or those under whom it claims have been seized or possessed
of the premises; but this section shall not apply to the province lands in the town of
Provincetown lying north and west of the line fixed by section twenty-five of chapter
ninety-one, to the Back Bay lands, so called, in Boston, or to any property, right, title
or interest of the commonwealth below high water mark or in the great ponds; provided,
further, that this section shall not bar any action by or on behalf of the commonwealth,
or any political subdivision thereof, for the recovery of land protection, wildlife
protection or other public purpose.
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 260, § 31 (West 1992).
55. 566 N.E.2d 614 (Mass. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 64 (1991).
56. Susan R. Boyle, Adverse Possession Bid Loses, MASS. LAW. WKLY., March 4, 1991, at
1. In Town of Sandwich, the defendant, Quirk, tried to gain title to four parcels of land by adverse
possession. Before Quirk completed his twenty year period of adverse possession, the town took
title to the property for tax non-payment but did not use or sell the parcels. Town of Sandwich, 566
N.E.2d at 615. After Quirk had completed the twenty year period of adverse possession, the town
brought an action to obtain possession of the parcels. Id. The trial court held that the tax
foreclosure successfully interrupted the twenty year period and found for the town. Id. Quirk
appealed and the Supreme Judicial Court took the appeal on its own initiative. See id.
57. See Town of Sandwich, 566 N.E.2d. at 615. The town did not contend that the land taken
for non-payment of taxes was held for a public purpose and hence the Quirks could not adversely
possess the land for this reason. See id.

ADVERSE POSSESSION

title from a municipality to an adverse possessor.5" Morse's evaluation

of the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion seems accurate. The Court's
dicta not only expresses a disdain for adverse possessors,5 9 but
prioritizes the rights of municipalities over the rights of adverse
possessors.'
The court justifies this deferential treatment because
municipalities take title to land under different circumstances than private
individuals. 6 Therefore, adverse possessors of municipal property
should expect a more difficult time proving cases in Massachusetts than
in Connecticut or Vermont. Regardless, each jurisdiction has created an

insurmountable burden for the adverse possessor.
B. The Governmental/ProprietaryDistinctionApproach
New York, Maryland, and most recently New Hampshire apply the
governmental/proprietary distinction approach to adverse possession
against municipal corporations. 2 This approach differs from Vermont,
Connecticut, and Massachusetts' approaches because whether a
municipality dedicates its land holdings for a public use is irrelevant. A
municipality's vulnerability to adverse possession claims is based on the
capacity in which the municipality owns the land, governmental or
proprietary.' The use to which the municipality has dedicated the land

58. See Boyle, supra note 56, at 1. Morse stated in an interview that while Massachusetts "has
c. 260, §31 theoretically permitting [adverse possession of government land), what the court may
be saying here is that it is very rare that the section has application. The public purpose exception
is very broad. The property would have to be a real oddball piece of property, like an abandoned
house. I think the court is saying that, while the law does stand there in theory, it is very rare [for
it to apply], and there is very little practical implication. It is almost the same as in most
jurisdictions which don't permit it." Id.
59. The court stated that the Town "failed to guard against the loss of their property either to
the local taxgatherer or to trespassers like the Quirks." Town of Sandwich, 566 A.2d at 616.
60. Id. ("An adverse possessor's rights should be subordinate to those of a municipality.").
61. Id. at 617. Municipalities have no practical option, as would a private individual, not to
take possession of property in certain situations, like for the non-payment of taxes. Based on this
premise, the court opted not to adopt a common law role that arguably would encumber
municipalities with the omissions of past record owners or with the omissions of public officials who
may have been negligent in obtaining property that was being possessed adversely. See id.; see also
Phipps Prods. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 443 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1982); Doris
v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 373 N.E.2d 944 (Mass. 1978).
62. See Long Island Research Bureau, Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 118 N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1952), aff'd, 125 N.E.2d 872 (1955); Siejack v. City of Baltimore, 313 A.2d 843 (Md.
1974); Kellison v. Mclsaac, 559 A.2d 834 (N.H. 1989).
63. The dual character of municipal corporations, the governmental and the proprietary
capacities, has led to an anomaly in the application of nulum tempus occurrit regi. If sound, the
exemption should apply to municipalities. But if the statute of limitation is grounded in sounder
principles, then the sovereign need not be exempted. The rise of a public-private test has forced
courts into a seemingly illogical compromise, but the result has been positive in the municipal arena.
See Note, State's Immunity to the Statute of Limitations, 38 U. ILL. L. REV. 418, 421 (1944).
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may be indicative of the capacity in which the municipality possesses the
land, but it is not the pivotal point as in other jurisdictions.

Under this approach, if the municipality owns the land in its
governmental capacity, adverse possession claims will not prevail." On

the other hand, municipal land held in a proprietary capacity will be
subjected to adverse possession claims.'

Generally, a municipality acts

in a governmental capacity when "it acts as an agent of the state on
behalf of the general public, and therefore, must be treated as the state

would be treated in like circumstances."' In most jurisdictions, state
owned land is immune to adverse possession claims.67 A municipality
acts in a proprietary capacity when it does not assume the personality of

the state; therefore, it is treated like a private corporation for adverse
possession purposes."
The permissiveness of the governmental/proprietary distinction
approach depends upon the individual jurisdictions' distinctions between
proprietary and governmental uses. For example, New Hampshire's

recent application of this rule results in a harsher treatment of adverse
possessors than the presumed public use approach as applied in Vermont
and Connecticut.
In Kellison v. Mclsaac,69 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire

affirmed the Superior Court's rejection of the plaintiff's adverse
possession claim to a right-of-way over the defendants' property.7' The
Town of Seabrook, a municipality, acquired title in 1957 by way of tax
non-payment to the parcel of land now held by the defendants."' In

64. See Long Island Research, 118 N.Y.S.2d at 39; Siejack, 313 A.2d at 843; Kellison, 559
A.2d at 834.
65. See Kellison, 559 A.2d at 837.
66. Michael P. Donnelly, Recent Decision, 35 MD. L. REv. 337, 341 (1975). "'Governmental
function' has to do with administration of some phase of government, that is to say, dispensing or
exercising some element of sovereignty, while 'proprietary function' is one designed to promote
comfort, convenience, safety and happiness of citizens." McPhee v. Dade County, 362 So.2d 74,
79 (Fla. App. 1978).
67. See Davis, supra note 1, at 578.
The great majority of the cases have held, recognized, or applied the broad general rle
that in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, statutes of limitation do not operate
against the state, and title to the state-owned lands cannot be acquired by adverse
possession or prescription while the state retains tile.
Id.
68. See Donnelly, supra note 66, at 341. Municipal corporations have a proprietary as well
as a governmental personality. When the municipality acts in its governmental role, it acts on behalf
of the general public as an agent of the state and thus is treated like the state itself. When the
municipality acts in a proprietary role, it is treated like any other private corporation. Id.
69. 559 A.2d 834 (N.H. 1989).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 835.

ADVERSE POSSESSION

1964, the town sold the land to one of the defendants' predecessors in
During this time, the plaintiffs were allegedly adversely
title.'
possessing the right-of-way." The court ruled that the town had owned
the land in its governmental capacity, and the plaintiffs were incapable
of adversely possessing the right-of-way during these years of
ownership. 4 Therefore, the plaintiffs did not adversely possess the
right-of-way for the statutory period of twenty years.
This decision was also supported by two New Hampshire statutes,
which prohibit the use of adverse possession against the state.7'
Although the statutes do not directly address municipal susceptibility to
adverse possession claims, they forbid adverse possession claims against
publicly used land and state owned land; hence, the supreme court
appropriately adopted the governmental/proprietary distinction approach
in Kellison.
The Kellison decision demonstrates the harshness of the
governmental/proprietary distinction approach when applied to adverse
possession claims against municipalities. In Kellison, mere retention of
title, without more, was enough to hold the municipality immune to
adverse possession claims, so long as the municipality owned the land in
a governmental capacity.76 No plans for development or use was
necessary to gain this immunity to adverse possession claims.' Even
though the Town of Seabrook, the municipal owner in Kellison, obtained
the land through the non-payment of taxes and held the land idle for
seven years without any plans for its use, they enjoyed immunity from
any adverse possession claims.7" This result offers even more deference
to municipalities than Massachusetts' Town of Sandwich decision.79

72. Id.
73. Id. The Plaintiffs were using the right-of-way as a driveway to gain access to their land.
Kellison v. Mclsaac, 559 A.2d 834, 835 (N.H. 1989).
74. Kellison, 559 A.2d at 838.
75. The statutes provide: "No right shall be acquired by such entry or possession, nor by
any adverse possession of such land, as against the state or its grantees." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 539.6 (1974).
"No person shall acquire by prescription a right to any part of a town house, schoolhouse or
church lot, or of any public ground by fencing or otherwise inclosing the same or in any way
occupying it adversely for any length of time." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477.34 (1992).
76. Keison, 559 A.2d at 837.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. In Town of Sandwich, the court ruled that, although a taking for nonpayment of taxes
stopped an adverse possessor's claims on that property and forced the adverse possessor to start the
clock all over again, the adverse possessor could still adversely possess against the owning
municipality since there was no dedication, or plans for a dedication, to a public use. See Town of
Sandwich v. Quirk, 566 N.E.2d 614 (Mass. 1991).
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The Kellison decision goes a step further than Town of Sandwich
and makes, as a matter of law, all adverse possession claims against
municipal land owners holding lands as a result of tax takings ineffective
because such an ownership is within the municipality's governmental
capacity.' In Jarvis, the Supreme Court of Vermont explicitly rejected
the Kellison decision because it, "in essence, exempts all municipal lands
from adverse possession claims."8"
New Hampshire is not alone in its application of the
governmental/proprietary distinction to adverse possession claims against
municipalities. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in its 1974 decision
of Siejack v. City of Baltimore,' applied the distinction to adverse
possession cases. In the early 1900's, the legislature forced the city to
acquire a parcel from a water company.' The city never applied the
parcel for any public purpose; therefore, the court concluded that the city
did not hold the parcel in its governmental capacity. As a result, the
plaintiff acquired the parcel by adverse possession.'
New York also
has applied this distinction to adverse possession cases concerning
municipalities.'
As with the jurisdictions applying the public use presumption
approach, these jurisdictions have not clearly defined both governmental
and proprietary capacities in terms of land ownership.'
Most
jurisdictions agree that streets and roadways are owned in a governmental
capacity,' and Maryland has defined land not dedicated to a public use
as a proprietary function. 9 New Hampshire has ruled that owning
lands as a result of tax non-payment is a governmental use.' ° These

80.
81.

Kellison, 559 A.2d at 837.
Jarvis v. Gillespie, 587 A.2d 981, 987 (Vt. 1991). The court indicated that this rule was

far too strict. Id.
82. 313 A.2d 843 (Md. 1974).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. "Siejack is the first Maryland adverse possession case in which a governmentalproprietary distinction has been used to divest a municipal corporation of property." Donnelly,
supra note 65, at 341.
86. See Long Island Land Research Bureau, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 118 N.Y.S.2d 39
(N.Y. App. Div. 1952); City of Tonawanda v. Elliot Creek Homeowners Association, Inc., et al.,
449 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N. Y. App. Div. 1982), appeal dismissed without opinion, 58 N.Y.2d 824
(1983).
87. Donnelly, supra note 66, at 342.
88. Id. ("These jurisdictions agree that streets and other public roadways definitely fall within
the 'governmental' category and are not therefore subject to adverse possession.").
89. Id. at 343; see also Messersmith v. Mayor and Common Council at Riverdale, 164 A.2d
523 (Md. 1960).
90. Kellison v. Mclsaac, 559 A.2d 834, 837 (N.H. 1989).
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examples illustrate that jurisdictions using the governmental/proprietary
distinction have left the issue of defining the different capacities in which
municipalities own lands as a factual question.
C. The Present Public Use Approach
Both New Jersey and Pennsylvania have comparatively liberal
approaches to applying adverse possession claims against municipal
governments. Both states employ a present public use approach to such
adverse possession claims.9
The present public use approach differs from the public use
presumption approach in two important ways. First, an adverse
possessor need not overcome an underlying presumption of public use. 2
However, the adverse possessor must still prove the five elements of
adverse possession as well as show that the municipality was not using
the land for a public use.' Therefore, the municipality must counter
adverse possession claims by offering evidence that the land was used for
a public purpose, rather than waiting for an adverse possessor to
overcome a rebuttable presumption.
The second difference is that the present public use approach ignores
future uses of the land. Unlike public use presumption jurisdictions,
adverse possessors do not have to validate a claim by proving that the
municipality has no future plans for a public use of the land.9 Instead,
adverse possessors must prove that the municipality has not and is not
using the land for a public purpose." Without having to overcome a
presumption and without having to prove a municipality's future plans
for the land, adverse possessors in present public use jurisdictions have
a greater advantage than other jurisdictions.
In Devins v. Borough of Bogate, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
adopted the most liberal common law approach in the country.' Only
those states that allow adverse possession claims against state and local
governments by statute are more liberal. These states, Kentucky,'

91. See Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1991); Torch v. Constantino, 323
A.2d 278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
92. See Devins, 592 A.2d 199; Torch, 323 A.2d 278.
93. See Devins, 592 A.2d 199; Torch, 323 A.2d 278.
94. See Devins, 592 A.2d 199; Torch, 323 A.2d 278.
95. See Devins, 592 A.2d 199; Torch, 323 A.2d 278.
96. Devins, 592 A.2d 199. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has reiterated that nullum
tempus occurritregi is a dying and disfavored doctrine. See Rutgers v. Grad Partnership, 634 A.2d
1053 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993), cert. denied, 640 A.2d 851 (N.J. 1994).
97. The statute provides: "The limitations prescribed in this chapter shall apply to actions
brought by or in the Commonwealth the same as to actions by private persons, except where a
different time is prescribed by statute." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.150 (Baldwin 1991).
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In Devins, the court held that nullum tempus occurrit regi is an
anachronism in regards to municipal owned property not dedicated to a
public use.1°2 Therefore, the plaintiffs, who adversely possessed a
borough-owned 25-by-100 foot lot, could gain title through adverse
possession because the municipality never dedicated the parcel to a public

98. The statute provides:
The State will not sue any person for, or in respect of, any real property, or the issue or
profits thereof, by reason of the right or title of the State to the same(1) When the person in possession thereof, or those under whom he claims, has
been in the adverse possession thereof for thirty years, this possession having been
ascertained and identified under known and visible lines or boundaries; which shall give
a title in fee to the possessor.
(2) When the person in possession thereof, or those under whom he claims, has
been in possession under color of tide for twenty-one years, this possession having been
ascertained and identified under known and visible lines or boundaries.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-35 (1992).
99. The statute provides:
The state of North Dakota will not sue any person for or in respect to any real property
or the issues or profits thereof by reason of the right or tide of the state to the same,
unless:
(1) Such right or title has accrued within forty years before any action or other
proceeding for the same shall be commenced; or
(2) The state or those from whom it claims have received the rents and profits of
such real property or of some part thereof within the space of forty years.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-01 (1991).
100. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-2 (1992) is identical to the North Dakota statute except that
seven years" replaces "forty years." See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-01.
101. The statute provides:
Tide to or interest in real property belonging to the state or a city, village, town, county,
school district, sewerage district or any other unit of government within this state may
be obtained by adverse possession, prescription or user under s.893.25, 893.26, 893.27,
893.28 only if the adverse possession, prescription or user continues uninterruptedly for
more than 20 years. No title to real property held in trust by the state under s. 24.01(2)
to (6) shall be obtained by adverse possession, prescription or user.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.29 (West 1983).
102. See Steven P. Bann, Adverse Possession-Municipalities,N.J.L.J., Aug. 15, 1991, at 55.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Devins reasoned as follows:
Ultimately, the issue is one of public policy. We believe the better rule concerning
municipally-owned real property not dedicated to or used for a public purpose is to treat
it like property owned by private owners. Underlying our belief is the perception that
we are not imposing an undue burden on municipalities by expecting them to discover
within the relevant period of limitations what property they own and who possesses it.
That expectation will encourage municipalities to make efficient use of their property and
return it to the tax rolls. Conversely, we are reluctant to adopt a policy that would
encourage municipalities not to use, dedicate, or even identify their property.
We conclude that for municipally-owned real estate not dedicated to or used for a
public purpose, nullum tempus is an anachronism.
Devins, 592 A.2d at 203.
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use.'I3 The plaintiffs were neither required to overcome any public use
presumption nor required to predict the Borough's future land use
plans.1°4 The court simply applied the adverse possession claim in the
same manner that municipalities lack immunity to tort claims"'° and
contract claims."' 6

Many municipal law experts have not warmly embraced this liberal
rule, and the legislature in New Jersey may very well reverse
Devins.107 The chairperson of the New Jersey State Bar Association's
Local Government Law Section, John Harrington, viewed the decision
as a great change from a "cardinal rule of Anglo-Saxon law," as well as
Frederic Stickel, General
a burden to municipal governments. 0
Counsel to the New Jersey League of Municipalities, criticized the court
as legislating throughout the entire opinion."
Finally, in 1993, New
Jersey legislators John Rooney and Charlotte Vandervalk each sponsored
bills designed to reverse Devins and prohibit the use of adverse
possession against municipal governments."10 Rooney's bill (currently
called A-390 and awaiting another assembly vote) passed the Assembly
on June 21, 1993 by a 76-to-2 vote,"' and Vandervalk's bill (currently
call A-1007) passed on June 17, 1993 by a 78-to-O vote."' While
these bills are not yet laws, the legislature is obviously determined to
eradicate New Jersey's liberal court-made rule.

103. See Devins, 592 A.2d 199. The Borough had acquired title to the property through an in
rem foreclosure in 1962. Id. at 200. After this, the Borough made no improvements to the lot nor
dedicated it to any public purpose. Id. The plaintiffs purchased an adjacent lot in 1965. Id. The
plaintiffs used the Borough's lot for parking, cookouts, and lounging. Id. The plaintiffs also
constructed a basketball backboard on the lot, as well as a shed, and a paved parking area. The
Plaintiffs claimed title to the Borough's lot in 1985 in a letter written to the Mayor and Borough
Council. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Willis v. Dep't of Conservation and Economic Dev., 264 A.2d 34 (N.J. 1970) (finding
that municipalities lack immunity to tort claims); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 12-3 (West 1992).
106. P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. Comm'r, Dep't of Transp., 262 A.2d 195 (N.J. 1970) (finding
that municipalities lack immunity to contract claims); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:13-1 to 13-10 (West
1992).
107. See Russ Bleemer, A ComplicatedPath To Preventing Takings, N.J.L.J., July 12, 1993,
at 4.
108. Jeffrey Kanige, SquattersHave Rights, Even on MunicipalLand,N.J.L.J., July 18, 1991,
at 27.
109. Id.
110. Bleemer, supra note 107, at 4.
111. The Rooney Bill applied to all state and political subdivision lands. Id.; see Valerie L.
Brown, Pending Legislation, N.J. LAW., May 16, 1994, at 4.
112. The Vandervalk Bill was amended to include county property. Id. see Board Opposes
Term Limits For ChiefJustices, N.J. LAW., Feb. 7, 1994, at 9.
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Pennsylvania's rather liberal present public use approach is not in
danger of eradication. Pennsylvania adopted this approach over one
hundred years ago in Evans v. Erie County"3 where the court held that
nullum tempus occurritreipublicaeapplies to the sovereign alone and that
municipal corporations are susceptible to adverse possession." 4 This
doctrine was refined over the decades and took its present form in Torch

v. Constantino."5
This rule is similar to New Jersey's now endangered rule in most
respects, except that the Pennsylvania courts and legislature have
exhibited a certain unease with its application and have taken appropriate
steps to limit its use. The Pennsylvania Legislature has forbidden the

extension of adverse possession to Commonwealth property under any
circumstances." 6 This law insures that adverse possession claims will
affect only municipal governments."" Also, in a recent decision, the
Superior Court has demonstrated a certain hostility to the concept of

applying adverse possession to municipalities."'

113. 66 Pa. 222.(1870).
114. Id. at 228. The dispute concerned a strip of land owned by the Borough of Erie. James
Evans, the defendant, adversely possessed the strip for thirty-one years before the borough brought
an ejectment action. Id. The Defendant used the strip for fanning and had erected a fence on the
western 'side of the tract. Id. at 229. The court held "[tihat the Statute of Limitations runs against
a county or other municipal corporation, we think cannot be doubted. The prerogative is that of the
sovereign alone: Nullum Tempus Occurrit Reipublicae. Her grantees, though artificial bodies
created by her, are in the same category with natural persons." Id. at 228. Hence, the defendant
prevailed in the ejectment action against the borough and obtained title. Id. at 229; see also Torch
v. Constantino, 323 A.2d 278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
115. 323 A.2d 278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974). In Torch, the Superior Court did not allow adverse
possession to be applied to a county who acquired title through nonpayment of taxes. The county
was deemed to have dedicated the land to a public use. Id. at 280. Therefore, the adverse polssessor
of the 0.65 acre parcel was incapable of acquiring title. Id. at 281. But the court did reaffirm the
rule that a public use is necessary for a municipality to gain immunity to adverse possession. Id.
at 280. The liberal present public use approach was retained. Id. at 278.
116. The statute provides: "Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to give any tide
to any lands by a claim of title adverse to that of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania shall be made
or recorded under the provisions of this act." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 88 (1965).
117. See Torch, 323 A.2d 278.
118. Williamstown Borough Authority v. Cooper, 591 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). In
Williamstown Borough Authority, the Superior Court ruled against an adverse possessor of borough
land even though the borough was unaware of its ownership interest in the entire tract for at least
seventy years. The court sided with the municipality because it considered the waterpipe that ran
underneath a portion of the forty-six acre strip to be a public use significant enough to bestow
immunity upon the municipality even though the adverse possessors had never used land above the
waterpipe. Id. at 715. Such a ruling truly demonstrates that, while the Pennsylvania present public
use approach may be liberal, adverse possessors may have a tough battle in proving that a
municipality's land holding is not dedicated to some public purpose since a public use can be so
broadly defined.
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V. Effectiveness of Approaches in Fulfilling the Goals of Adverse
Possession
All adverse possession statutes of limitations share four basic goals.
These goals are: (1) to promote efficient adjudications concerning land
by preventing claims based on stale evidence, (2) to promote certainty of
title and the free alienation of land, (3) to promote active and efficient
use of land, and (4) to promote municipal efficiency and the return of
property to the tax rolls." 9 The different approaches that apply
adverse possession against municipalities fulfill these goals with differing
degrees of effectiveness and efficiency.
The first goal of adverse possession is to promote efficient
adjudications concerning land by preventing claims based on stale
evidence." ° After a period of time, memories fade, and, unavoidably,
evidence and witnesses supporting the claim will be lacking.'l If land
owners were forced to maintain the necessary records in order to oppose
adverse title claims for an unlimited time period, the costs would be
Therefore,
exorbitant; hence, economic inefficiency will result."z
adverse possession eliminates potentially inaccurate litigation by
encouraging parties out of possession to either substantiate their claims
in a timely, efficient manner or lose all rights against the possessor.
The present public use and the public use presumption approaches
fail to fulfill this goal of adverse possession. In these jurisdictions,
municipalities may always bring ejectment actions against adverse
possessors no matter how long a municipality has been out of possession
because a municipality either can argue that its use was for a public
purpose or can simply fall back on the public use presumption and force
the adverse possessor to prove otherwise. Such an argument forces the
use of stale if not specious evidence, places the adverse possessor at a
great disadvantage, and encourages lawsuits that come to predictably
imprecise conclusions. This result was demonstrated in Williamstown
Borough Authority v. Cooper!' where the evidence, dating from the
late 1800's, made it difficult to ascertain when the municipality ceased
to be aware of its ownership in the parcel and what kind of ownership
interest the municipality had in the first place." All of these questions

119. Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 1991).
120. Id.
121. Jeffrey M. Netter et al., An Economic Analysis of Adverie Possession Statutes, 6 INT'L
REv. OF LAW & ECON. 217, 219 (1986).
122. Id.
123. 591 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
124. Id.
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were answered with utterly stale evidence since the municipality could
invoke the public use argument. 125
Only the governmental/proprietary distinction approach fulfills this
goal of adverse possession; however, the approach encourages the use of
stale evidence. Only the municipality's capacity of ownership must be
proven, not the nature of its use." Therefore, this limiting of factual
material inadvertently prevents a case from being inundated with stale
evidence.
The second goal of adverse possession promotes certainty of title
and the free alienation of land." Since it is exceedingly difficult to
establish prima facie proof of title to land through paper alone,"
possession must be recognized as title in certain instances. Although
possession rewards the trespasser, it is necessary in order to quiet titles
and establish the ownership of land, making it freely alienable. 29 Only
through the existence of an adverse possession statute of limitations can
title be quieted, and present possessors are assured that no lingering
claims exist. 110
The government/proprietary distinction approach most effectively
fulfills this goal. When the municipality's ownership capacity is held as
3 ' prevents all future challenges
governmental, res judicata"
to that

125. Id.
126. See Kellison v. Mclsaac, 559 A.2d 834 (N.H. 1989). All the municipality had to prove
in Kellison was that the land in question was held as a result of the non-payment of taxes, which is
a governmental use in New Hampshire. No other evidence needed to be presented to establish the
capacity of ownership. Id.
127. See Henry W. Ballantine, tlle by Adverse Possession, 32 HARv. L. REV. 135 (1918). The
purpose of the statute of limitations is not a mechanism by which the courts reward trespassers and
punish those who sleep on their rights, but provides proof of tite, corrects errors in conveyancing,
and offers peace of mind to possessors of land. See id.
128. The deed by which an owner acquires title is not primafacie proof of title in ejectment
proceedings, nor are most chains of title. More than just paper is often needed in order for a
possessor to make his or her title secure. See id. at 136.
129. Id.
Although in general a tortious act can never be the foundation of a legal or equitable title,
yet if the exercise of apparent ownership is made conclusive evidence of title, this
wholesale method necessarily establishes and quiets the bad along with the good. The
trespasser benefits, the true owner suffers, for the repose of meritorious titles generally.
As Sir Frederick Pollock put it, "It is better to favor some unjust than to vex many just
occupiers."
Id.
130. Netter, supra note 119, at 219. Adverse possession reduces title transfer risks. When a
possessor has occupied a parcel for a long period of time, the possessor will know for sure that his
title is good. This type of assurance was even more valuable when deed recording was less
developed. See id.
131. Resjudicata bars a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action
when there has been a final judgment on the merits. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 1305 (6th ed.
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parcel. Therefore, the decision permanently establishes certainty of title
in that parcel so long as the municipality does not convey it.
The present public use and the public use presumption approaches
also fulfill this goal, but not as effectively as the
governmental/proprietary distinction approach.
These approaches
establish certainty of title and allow alienation at the end of the
proceeding; however, if, after prevailing a claim, the municipality
changes the use of the parcel another challenge may arise. Under the
governmental/proprietary distinction approach, res judicata bars future
challenges since the use of the land is irrelevant. Only the capacity in
which the municipality owns the land is material under this
2
approach.
The third goal of adverse possession promotes the active and
efficient use of land. 3 This goal has been criticized as wrongly
assuming that a record owner's non-use of land automatically amounts
to an inefficient waste of the land's value;" however, this goal has
merit. While the non-use of land can be of great public value (such as
land left in its natural state for the benefit of the environment' 35 ),
municipal owners of land dedicated to a valuable non-use should have a
duty to regularly examine their holdings to insure that the land is still
functioning in its dedicated capacity.
If an adverse possessor uses land dedicated to a valuable non-use
and no one ejects the trespasser, including the record owner, logically
the non-use could not have been valuable to the public. Once an adverse
possessor violates a land's non-use, the land's expressed usefulness
ceases by virtue of its new use. If municipal land owners dedicate their
holdings to arguably valuable non-uses, they should be encumbered with
the responsibility to monitor and maintain these uses. This responsibility

1990).
132. See Long Island Research Bureau, Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 118 N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1952); Siejack v. City of Baltimore, 313 A.2d 843 (Md. 1974); Kellison v. Mclsaac, 559
A.2d 834 (N.H. 1989).
133. Netter, supra note 119, at 219.
134. A justification for the existence of adverse possession laws is that they reward the use of
land and punish those who sleep on their rights. Adverse possession provides incentives to use land.
A major problem with this justification is that it assumes that the original owner was not using his
or her land in a valuable way by leaving it idle. This is a problem because a parcel's most valuable
use might be in the future, or it might be a valuable non-use of environmental resources which pays
the owner more, personally and financially, to keep unexploited. Such uses could include
greenbelts, buffer land between undeveloped public recreation land and developed land, and land
lying along roads that have not been made passable enough to facilitate development. Id.; see also
Jarvis v. Gillespie, 587 A.2d 981 (Vt. 1991); Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199 (N.J.

1991).
135.

See Jarvis v. Gillespie, 587 A.2d 981, 987 (Vt. 1991).
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will insure that the valuable non-use is actually being pursued. Land
dedicated to a valuable non-use for the tax payers' benefit can only be
justified if the municipality monitors and protects the land from other
uses. Otherwise, if the land is being used adversely and no one notices,
obviously the environmental non-use status is ineffective and inefficient.
The present public use approach most effectively fulfills this goal of
adverse possession. Municipal land owners have the responsibility to
either dedicate their land holdings to a public use or closely monitor their
undedicated land for adverse possessors. If the municipality fails to put
the land to a public use, it may lose title through adverse possession. If
the municipality dedicates the land to a valuable non-use, or simply holds
the land idle, but fails to periodically monitor the land's usage, then the
municipality may still lose title or at least find itself wasting resources on
needless litigation. Since the present public use approach is the most
liberal approach among the rules, it best encourages the responsible use
of land by municipalities. This responsible use of land includes both
active uses of land, as well as valuable non-uses of land. In essence,
If they are valuable, then the
both serve a valuable purpose.
municipality should have a burden to justify and monitor the use just like
any private individual. The other two approaches also fulfill this third
goal of adverse possession, but not to the same extent as the present
public use approach.
The fourth goal of adverse possession promotes municipal efficiency
and the return of property to the tax rolls. 36 Most municipalities
generate most of their income from taxes levied on property. Therefore,
when municipalities own land that does not benefit the public, the public
loses twice since idle land generates no tax revenues and since the land
supplies no public benefit. The use of adverse possession against such
land forces municipalities to use the land for the good of the public or
so that it may be taxed for the municipality's
sell it to private individuals
37
financial benefit. 1
The present public use approach also best fulfills this goal because
this approach encumbers municipalities with the greatest amount of
responsibility for their land holdings. If the land is not dedicated to a
public use, it is subject to adverse possession. This danger acts as an
incentive for municipalities to sell such properties for cash rather than
risk losing them, an avenue that would generate no revenue. Therefore,

136. See Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 1991).
137. Id. This would promote a policy that would encourage municipalities to use, dedicate, and
identify their property. Without such a policy, municipalities would have no incentive to
productively use their land holdings. See id. at 203.
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any extra cost of policing municipal land would be offset by the
immediate cash as well as tax revenues generated by liquidating
undedicated properties.
The public use presumption approach fails to fulfill this goal
adequately. This approach forces adverse possessors to overcome a
demanding burden by proving that a municipality has no future use
planned for the land. Since the presumption is difficult to overcome
when the municipality is the present title holder of the land, little danger
that a municipality will lose title exists. Therefore, the goal is not
fulfilled.
The governmental/proprietary distinction approach also fails to
fulfill this goal adequately. Although municipalities are encouraged to
convey or efficiently monitor their proprietary holdings, they have no
incentive to monitor governmental holdings because governmental
holdings cannot be taken by adverse possession even absent a public use.
Since only holdings that are not governmental, including properties held
for tax non-payment, can be taken by adverse possessors, municipalities
have no incentive to sell the properties or use them for any public
purpose. Title alone can secure their immunity if the capacity is
governmental. 3
As demonstrated by this analysis, none of the three approaches
effectively fulfills all of the listed goals of adverse possession. The
present public use approach best encourages municipalities to:
(1) responsibly monitor their lands and (2) to either use their lands for
public purposes or convey it, thus expanding the tax rolls. But the
public use immunity clause, ingrained in this approach, fails to
discourage the use of stale evidence. In fact, municipalities seem
encouraged to wait to bring title actions until the statute of limitations has
run for non-publicly used lands so the past becomes misty enough to
defeat most adverse possessors on the public use question.
The public use presumption approach fails to fulfill any of the goals
of adverse possession except in securing title certainty. The use of stale
evidence or the bringing of untimely claims is not discouraged because
the door is always open for some form of litigation; adverse possessors
may always attempt to overcome the presumption. This approach
encourages certainty of title because, once an adverse possessor fails to
acquire title due to a finding of a public use, subsequent adverse
possessors will have difficulty obtaining the same parcel of land. Since
the chances of success are virtually nil, this approach fails to encourage

138.

See Kellison v. Mclsaac, 559 A.2d 834, 837 (N.H. 1989).
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efficient and responsible land use and the return of property to the tax
rolls. "9

The governmental/proprietary distinction approach only succeeds in
securing title certainty.
Once a court finds that property is
governmentally owned, future challenges are barred. The approach fails
to discourage the use of stale evidence and to encourage efficient land
use and the supplementing of the tax rolls. Since all of these approaches
apparently fail at fulfilling the overall goals of adverse possession, a new
approach is needed.
This new approach must not only fulfill the goals of adverse
possession but must significantly protect the municipalities from the loss
of important lands used for the public good. This approach must also
not place inefficient economic burdens on local governments.
The following characteristics best fulfill these goals.
The
governmental/proprietary distinction approach should serve as the basis
of this new approach. Since this approach strongly supports the goal of
title certainty and makes land alienable," 4 it is a good starting point.
However, for the governmental/proprietary distinction approach to fulfill
all the goals of adverse possession, a statute must greatly limit the
definition of a govermnental use. Governmental uses must be limited to
roads, streets, parks, and any other land, which the public has access to
on a regular basis. Land readily accessible to the public should not be
susceptible to adverse possession claims since these lands, by their very
nature, could not be used continuously by an adverse possessor except
in extremely unusual circumstances. All other land including buffer
land, land held for tax non-payment, and greenbelts should be considered
proprietary land and made subject to adverse possession. By making
more public land susceptible to adverse possession, municipalities will be
encouraged to efficiently monitor long term land holdings for adverse
possessors and replenish the tax rolls with land that is too expensive to
effectively monitor. It is not desirable for municipalities to lose land
through adverse possession, but such threat will encourage municipalities
to monitor their lands and insure that they are being used for their
expressed purposes.
The statute may also be specifically designed to discourage stale
claims.
The statute should bar most claims though the use of
unambiguous language that limits the factual issues. Since many stale
claims will be eliminated through this process, a longer statute of

139.

See American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of Trumball, 574 A.2d 796

(Conn. 1990).
140.

See Donnelly, supra note 66. at 337.

ADVERSE POSSESSION

limitations, such as forty years, may apply to municipal land in order to
better protect the public, thus counter balancing the increased
susceptibility of municipal land. 4'
This proposed approach will prevent stale claims by defining
governmental and proprietary uses for prospective adverse possession
claimants. On the other hand, the public will be adequately protected by
having a longer statute of limitations. The approach will assure certainty
of title because any court's decision on the use of a piece of land will be
resjudicata with regards to future claims. Additionally, this approach
will encourage municipalities to either responsibly use their lands for the
benefit of the public or encourage them to convey them (and replenish
the tax rolls) because the costs of monitoring the non-publicly used lands
may exceed the value of keeping them. Therefore, this approach
adequately fulfills all the goals.
VI. Conclusion
Courts have historically prohibited the use of adverse possession
against land owned by governments; however, over the years, they have
eroded this doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi. Now, most
jurisdictions allow the use of adverse possession against certain
governmental entities, especially municipal governments. Three primary
approaches apply to adverse possession against municipally-owned land:
the public use presumption approach, the present public use approach,
and the governmental/proprietary distinction approach. None of these
approaches fulfills all of the goals of adverse possession.
Jurisdictions must legislate a new approach based on the
governmental/proprietary distinction approach. This new statute should
explicitly enumerate and limit public use purposes. The approach should
have a longer than average statute of limitations in order to protect the
public. Such a statute would better fulfill the goals of adverse possession
than the existing approaches.
Carl C. Risch
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